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ABSTRACT—Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individuals may sue those who 
violate their constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. The 
Supreme Court has held that private actors may act under color of state 
law, and may be sued under § 1983 in some circumstances. However, 
courts have not been consistent in determining whether private university 
police forces act under color of state law. Private universities often 
maintain police forces that are given extensive police powers by state 
statutes but are controlled by private entities. Some courts have looked 
directly to the state statutes that delegate police power, but others have 
maintained a more fact-specific inquiry. The state enabling statutes 
themselves vary in their terms, but not their effects, and are thus partially 
responsible for this inconsistency. This Note proposes a model statute 
framework for delegating powers to private university police forces. Such a 
framework would better allow courts to apply the § 1983 color of law test 
consistently. A model statute would also clarify the role of campus police 
forces and would require minimal change in the operation of private 
campus police forces. The resulting consistency would ensure that no 
citizen is deprived of a remedy for a violation of constitutional rights.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Citizens should all have equal remedies under federal law, especially 
when being protected from unlawful state action. In the era of the modern 
university, states often no longer exercise such state action by directly 
policing private universities. Instead, private college and university police 
forces typically derive their authority to use police powers from state 
statutes.1 Although these statutes often differ in a variety of ways, campus 
police forces are often granted broad authority to exercise police power.2 
As a result, there is general uniformity in the effective power of campus 
police forces, but not in the means states use to grant this power. This lack 
of uniformity can have significant impact when campus police forces act in 
ways that would violate individuals’ constitutional rights if campus police 
were state actors. When state actors violate constitutional rights, 
individuals can seek redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a 
remedy for rights violations committed by persons acting under color of 
state law.3 However, the remedy does not extend to actions by private 
parties.4 
 
1 See, e.g., 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1020/1 (2015). 
2 See Valerie L. Brown, The Campus Security Act and Campus Law Enforcement, 70 EDUC. L. REP. 
1055, 1058–62 (1992). 
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
4 See id.; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999). 
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Some courts have considered the means of granting authority when 
determining whether campus police forces act under color of state law.5 As 
a result, students’ and individuals’ ability to bring suits alleging that 
campus police violated their constitutional rights can depend upon the 
method states use to grant power to campus police forces, but not 
necessarily on the power exercised by the campus police force itself. 
Students at some universities cannot bring these suits, and therefore do not 
have the same remedy as students at universities in other states or in other 
universities in the same state, even for the same offense by campus police. 
This Note advocates for uniformity in state enabling statutes granting 
authority to campus police forces, which will remedy this patchwork 
granting of police powers—both to clarify that campus police forces derive 
power from the state itself and also to provide campus police forces more 
clarity as to their oversight and their role as state actors. 
Equal access to federal remedies is an important touchstone of federal 
law, especially of § 1983, which provides citizens their only federal 
protection against rights infringements by the states. The disparate array of 
enabling acts and court treatment of enabling acts prevents all citizens from 
having equal remedies under § 1983. As this Note will demonstrate, these 
disparities result in citizens from different states, or even the same state, 
having different access to federal remedies. The solution proposed in this 
Note provides a model statute framework for states to adopt and 
interpretive guidelines for the courts to determine if a campus police officer 
is a state actor. This uniformity will ensure that all citizens have access to 
the same remedies under federal law and also adhere to § 1983’s purpose—
to provide citizens with federal remedies to protect them against unlawful 
state action. 
To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show two things: that he or 
she has been deprived of a right, and that the party who caused the 
deprivation acted under color of state law.6 This Note addresses the second 
element a plaintiff must prove: whether a campus police force depriving a 
citizen of his or her constitutional rights acts under color of state law. To 
demonstrate the party who deprives the plaintiff of his or her right has 
acted under color of state law, the plaintiff must show: (1) “the claimed 
deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its 
 
5 See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of San Diego, No. 10CV0504-LAB (NLS), 2011 WL 4345842, at *6–
7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011); Boyle v. Torres, 756 F. Supp. 2d 983, 993–94 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured . . . .”). 
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source in state authority,”7 and (2) the party responsible for such 
deprivation “[is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”8 
Enabling statutes make both these inquiries unclear because when private 
university campus police forces exercise their authority pursuant to state 
enabling statutes, they seem to exercise a power that has its source in state 
authority, but remain private actors. In fact, the method that states use to 
grant police authority to campus police forces can affect both how much 
power the campus police force is explicitly granted and how closely the 
campus police force works with the state. These factors impact the fact-
specific tests for action under color of state law. As a result, courts have 
reached different results when applying § 1983 to private campus police 
forces. 
Part I of this Note explains the history and purpose of § 1983 and the 
approaches courts have developed to discern whether an action was under 
color of state law. Part II explores the states’ various methods of granting 
police authority to campus police departments and the ways courts have 
applied § 1983 tests to campus police forces in light of these different 
enabling statutes. Part III proposes a model statute framework, which states 
should adopt to create uniformity, make explicit the modern campus police 
force’s role as a state actor, and clarify the campus police force’s role in 
law enforcement and its state oversight. 
Part III also demonstrates that making such police authority explicit in 
statutes will aid courts in determining when campus police forces act under 
color of state law. Regardless of the source of authority, campus police 
forces often act with the broad power of law enforcement, such as the 
ability to make arrests, carry firearms, and make traffic stops. When 
considering whether campus police forces are state actors, courts have 
struggled to reconcile the near-uniform exercise of power with the varying 
methods of granting such power. Explicit, uniform statutes will help courts 
clarify and understand campus police forces’ role in law enforcement and 
make their status as state actors explicit. Encouraging states to adopt 
similar standards when granting authority to campus police will 
consequently solve a procedural difficulty courts face, as well as the 
substantive problem of ensuring that no citizen is deprived of his or her 
rights without a remedy. Although some might argue such a framework is 
contrary to the function of states as laboratories, uniformity is required 
because § 1983 is a federal law providing a remedy for rights deprivation 
by state actors. 
 
7 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982). 
8 Id. at 937. 
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I. SECTION 1983 COLOR OF LAW ANALYSIS FOR PRIVATE ACTORS 
A. History of Action Under Color of State Law in § 1983 
Over the past several decades, campuses have shifted from employing 
ordinary security guards to full-fledged professional police forces.9 Along 
with their increase in power, campus police forces often face unique 
constitutional concerns, given their place within universities as they 
confront issues of privacy,10 speech,11 and arrests.12 Furthermore, increasing 
levels of armament among campus police forces raise the specter of 
potential constitutional violations during arrests when campus police 
officers can exercise significant levels of force.13 In many cases, campus 
police departments look no different than ordinary police departments, such 
as participation in the 1033 program, in which law enforcement agencies 
receive military surplus equipment from the Department of Defense.14 
Thus, determining whether private college police forces are state actors 
under § 1983 has become increasingly important, as this increased 
armament indicates that the distinction between public and private actors—
and thus the availability of remedies—becomes less clear even as the 
potential for the use of force has increased. 
Congress enacted § 1983 in 1871 under the authority of Section Five 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 The purpose of the statute was to establish 
“the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights 
against state power,”16 providing a uniform guarantee of rights even in a 
federalist system. The statute creates a civil action, allowing for both 
injunctive relief and damages against individuals and state and local 
governments for “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
 
9 Jamie P. Hopkins & Kristina Neff, Jurisdictional Confusion That Rivals Erie: The Jurisdictional 
Limits of Campus Police, 75 MONT. L. REV. 123, 126 (2014). 
10 See, e.g., Jones v. Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys., 816 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 
11 See, e.g., Felber v. Yudof, 851 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1186–87 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
12 See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of San Diego, No. 10CV0504-LAB (NLS), 2011 WL 4345842, at *1 
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011). 
13 When courts consider campus police forces to be state actors, many cases of actual § 1983 
liability involve campus police use of excessive force. See, e.g., Boyle v. Torres, 756 F. Supp. 2d 983, 
988–89 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
14 Dan Bauman, Campus Police Acquire Military Weapons, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/world/americas/campus-police-acquire-military-weapons.html? 
_r=1 [http://perma.cc/3Y8T-5FUT]. Critics have expressed concern that “the procurement of tactical 
gear doesn’t help with the types of crimes that occur more frequently on college campuses, like alcohol-
related incidents and sexual assault. Others worry that military equipment is an especially poor fit for 
college campuses and may have a chilling effect on free expression.” Id. 
15 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961); 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL 
LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 §§ 1:1, 2:1 (4th ed. 1997). 
16 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972). 
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secured by the Constitution and laws.”17 In particular, § 1983 provides a 
cause of action against persons acting “under color of” state law.18 
Although the statute was rarely used in the years after its passage, the 1961 
U.S. Supreme Court decision Monroe v. Pape changed this by broadly 
interpreting the statute’s reach.19 In Monroe, police officers broke into the 
plaintiffs’ home and ransacked it, forced the plaintiffs to stand naked in the 
living room, and subsequently detained Mr. Monroe for ten hours.20 The 
Court affirmed that “under color of” state law included instances when 
state officials abused their position and power, not only when they acted 
pursuant to official state law or policy.21 Monell v. Department of Social 
Services expanded § 1983 to include rights violations by local governments 
in addition to states.22 
The Monroe Court’s holding was supported by the Court’s 
incorporation of Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.23 Incorporation is the process through which the Supreme 
Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment to apply various provisions of 
the Bill of Rights to the states, requiring states, in addition to the federal 
government, to guarantee those rights.24 Fourteenth Amendment rights have 
therefore expanded as provisions of the Bill of Rights were incorporated 
into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states.25 As a result, 
§ 1983 causes of action against state government actors include violations 
of those provisions of the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated into 
the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as other violations of Fourteenth 
Amendment rights, such as procedural due process and equal protection,26 
 
17 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also 1 NAHMOD, supra note 15, at § 2:1 (“Section 1983 of Title 42 
of the U.S. Code . . . creates an action for damages and injunctive relief against individuals and local 
governmental bodies who deprive a plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities ‘secured by the 
Constitution and laws.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 
19 1 NAHMOD, supra note 15, at § 2:2. 
20 365 U.S. at 169. 
21 Id. at 172, 184, 187 (adopting the approach of Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), 
which addressed the same issue in criminal cases). 
22 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
23 365 U.S. at 171 (citing incorporation of the Fourth Amendment right in Wolf v. Colorado, 
338 U.S. 25 (1949), and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)). 
24 1 NAHMOD, supra note 15, at § 2:3. Rights that have been incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment include “[f]reedom of speech, press, assembly and petition[,] . . . [f]ree exercise . . . of 
religion[,] . . . [and p]rotection against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” Id.  
25 See id. 
26 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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and process-based rights, such as privacy.27 Section 1983 also creates 
causes of action for deprivation of those rights secured by federal statutes.28 
Because the Supreme Court has articulated a fact-specific test for which 
federal statutorily created rights have a § 1983 remedy,29 this Note only 
addresses violations of rights found in the Constitution, applied to states via 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and will not address rights created by federal 
statute. 
B. Tests to Determine if a Private Entity Acts Under Color of State Law 
To state a cause of action under § 1983 for a Fourteenth Amendment 
violation, a plaintiff must show the defendant’s conduct is (1) a state 
action, to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment requirement, and (2) an action 
under color of state law, to satisfy the § 1983 statutory requirement.30 The 
Supreme Court has held that these requirements are identical for practical 
purposes.31 State action, and therefore action under color of law, can 
sometimes be attributed to private actors.32 However, federalism33 and 
liberty34 concerns have made the Supreme Court reluctant to expand the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s power to private actors. The Supreme Court has 
articulated ways that a private actor undertakes state action, or acts under 
 
27 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481, 485 (1965). 
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
29 1 NAHMOD, supra note 15, at § 2:27 (“As it turns out, the Court has articulated a test that is 
applied on a statute-by-statute basis. This test focuses both on the existence of a federal statutory right 
and on congressional intent to foreclose a § 1983 remedy.”). 
30 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982). 
31 Id. at 929; see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 162–69 (1970) (exploring the 
legislative history of § 1983 to show that its “under color of state law” requirement is an exercise of 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment power to prevent constitutional violations perpetrated by the states). 
But see Lugar, 457 U.S. at 950 (Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting) (arguing 
that there is a distinction between state action and action under color of state law); Adickes, 398 U.S. at 
211–12 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he statutory term ‘under color of any statute’ has a 
narrower meaning than the constitutional concept of ‘state action.’ . . . [T]he word ‘color,’ . . . suggests 
a kind of holding out and means ‘appearance, semblance, or simulacrum,’ but not necessarily the 
reality. . . . [A] public official acting by virtue of his official capacity always acts under color of a state 
statute or other law, whether or not he overtly relies on that authority to support his action, and whether 
or not that action violates state law. A private person acts ‘under color of’ a state statute or other law 
when he, like the official, in some way acts consciously pursuant to some law that gives him aid, 
comfort, or incentive, . . . or when he acts in conjunction with a state official . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
32 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (indicating that the inquiry 
for determining whether a private actor engages in state action is fact-specific). 
33 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“[The Fourteenth Amendment] does not 
invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of [s]tate 
legislation . . . .”). 
34 Id. at 14 (“[Legislation regulating private conduct] steps into the domain of local jurisprudence, 
and lays down rules for the conduct of individuals in society towards each other . . . . If [legislation 
regulating private conduct] is appropriate for enforcing the prohibitions of the amendment, it is difficult 
to see where it is to stop.”). 
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color of law, but has declined to clarify if these are actually separate tests 
or “simply different ways of characterizing the necessarily fact-bound 
inquiry that confronts the Court in such a situation.”35 Scholars have 
consolidated these approaches into three categories36: (1) when the private 
actor is coerced or encouraged by the state or local government;37 (2) when 
the private actor and the state have a sufficiently symbiotic or mutually 
beneficial relationship;38 or (3) when the private actor exercises a 
traditionally public function.39 
The first approach, state coercion or encouragement of the private 
behavior, and the second approach, a symbiotic relationship between the 
state and the private actor, essentially inquire about the level of state 
involvement in the private activity. Courts generally hold these approaches 
to apply narrowly. For example, when applying this coercion or 
encouragement approach, courts have found government involvement 
when the state required the private action,40 or when the “assistance” of the 
state was “overt” or “significant.”41 In other words, the state must actively 
 
35 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 (majority opinion). 
36 E.g., 1 NAHMOD, supra note 15, at § 2:4; Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. 
U. L. REV. 503, 508 n.19 (1985); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in 
Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 302, 314 
(1995); Ronna Greff Schneider, The 1982 State Action Trilogy: Doctrinal Contraction, Confusion, and 
a Proposal for Change, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1150, 1160 (1985). Some scholars split the tests into 
more categories, but in such cases those categories can be combined into the tests described here. See, 
e.g., David D. Christensen, Corporate Liability for Overseas Human Rights Abuses: The Alien Tort 
Statute After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1219, 1254 (2005). 
37 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (“[A] State normally can be held responsible for a 
private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant 
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.”); 
see also Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 273 (1963) (finding state action when store officials were 
coerced by the city to ask black petitioners to leave a segregated store counter). 
38 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723–24 (1961) (holding that public 
ownership and use, publicly funded maintenance, and intertwined financial benefits of the state and 
private actor were sufficient to constitute state action). 
39 See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1966) (relying on the public function 
approach as alternative ground for holding that a park with a private trustee is subject to the Equal 
Protection Clause); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (“Since [company town] facilities are 
built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public 
function, it is subject to state regulation.”); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944) (“[S]tate 
delegation to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state 
function that may make the party’s action the action of the [s]tate.”). 
40 E.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 148 (1970) (holding that a § 1983 violation can 
be made out by showing state-enforced custom required racial segregation); Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of discriminatory private covenants constitutes 
state action). 
41 E.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991). The question of how much 
participation by the state is sufficient to convert private action into state action remains contentious. 
Compare Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 942 (1982) (“The Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that in this context ‘joint participation’ required something more than invoking the aid of state 
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participate in the conduct for it to constitute state action; passive 
acquiescence is not sufficient.42 On the other hand, mere regulation, even 
extensive regulation, of a private actor is not considered to be such 
participation and is not sufficient involvement to constitute state action;43 
there must be “a sufficiently close nexus” between the state actor and the 
private action “so that the action of the [private actor] may be fairly treated 
as that of the State itself.”44 Like regulation, public funding is insufficient 
state involvement to turn the behavior of a private school into state action.45 
The symbiotic relationship approach applies in similarly narrow 
situations. Although public funding may indicate that the government is 
paying for a benefit provided by the private actor, it does not trigger a 
symbiotic relationship.46 Thus, courts only find state action using this 
approach when benefits are inured to the state beyond those a private 
business may provide as part of a state contract. For example, the Supreme 
Court found a symbiotic relationship when a local parking authority leased 
space to a restaurant that discriminated based on race.47 Because the 
restaurant claimed that the discrimination increased traffic to the restaurant, 
and therefore also to the parking facility, the Court found the government 
parking facility received benefits from the restaurant’s conduct beyond 
mere rent payments.48 Therefore, the first two approaches—evaluating state 
coercion and a state symbiotic relationship—require a fairly high level of 
government involvement to convert private action into state action.49 
 
officials to take advantage of state-created attachment procedures.”), with id. at 943 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (“Invoking a judicial process, of course, implicates the State and its officers but does not 
transform essentially private conduct into actions of the State.” (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 
(1980))), and id. at 951 (Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting) (“[O]ur cases do 
not establish that a private party’s mere invocation of state legal procedures constitutes ‘joint 
participation’ . . . .”). 
42 Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (“This Court . . . has never held that a State’s 
mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of the State.”). 
43 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974). 
44 Id. at 351 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972)). 
45 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982).  
46 See id. at 841 (holding that private corporations fulfilling government contracts do not engage in 
state action when performing those contracts). 
47 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961). 
48 Id. 
49 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (holding that there is sufficient government 
involvement to constitute state action when “the State is responsible for the specific conduct”); Rendell-
Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 (stating that the policy choice to provide services for special needs students does 
not make those services “the exclusive province of the State”). 
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Third, courts have limited the public function approach to those 
functions that are traditionally exclusive to the state.50 The Court has found 
few functions that satisfy this exclusivity requirement.51 Furthermore, the 
Court has carefully avoided issuing general declarations of which public 
functions are traditionally exclusive to the state, and thus constitute state 
action when they are delegated to private actors,52 preferring to rely on fact-
specific inquiries.53 Instead, the outcome of this approach often turns on 
how narrowly the state function is defined.54 Turning to the topic of this 
Note, although some courts have held that explicit statutory delegation of 
all police powers indicates a public function that creates action under color 
of state law,55 courts have also held that the power to arrest alone is not a 
power reserved exclusively to the state.56 As a result, the amount of power 
explicitly delegated by the state can significantly impact whether private 
police actors perform a public function.57 Thus, when a university employs 
its own private police force, the police force’s status as a state actor can 
vary based on the state’s delegation of power, even if the difference in 
power delegation is not apparent to students or other members of the 
university community.58 
Alternatively, some campus police behavior may require the 
application of the state encouragement or symbiotic relationship 
 
50 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352–53 (1974) (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 
296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Nixon v. 
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)). 
51 See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978) (“While many functions have been 
traditionally performed by governments, very few have been ‘exclusively reserved to the State.’”). In 
particular, establishing a system for “the resolution of private disputes” does not delegate a state 
function to private actors who make use of that system. Id. at 157, 163. 
52 Id. at 163–64 (1978) (declining to express a view as to whether certain state functions 
“administered with a greater degree of exclusivity by States and municipalities,” such as “education, 
fire and police protection, and tax collection” would be considered to be state action if they were 
delegated to private actors). 
53 See, e.g., Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135 (1964) (finding that a park security guard, who 
was also a deputy sheriff of the county, undertook state action when he ordered petitioners to leave the 
park and arrested them because he “purported to exercise” the “authority” of a deputy sheriff). 
54 See, e.g., Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 834–35 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that detaining a 
suspected shoplifter is not a function reserved exclusively to the state). 
55 E.g., Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(“[N]o legal difference exists between a privately employed special officer with full police powers and 
a regular Chicago police officer.”). 
56 E.g., Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir. 1996). 
57 See Boyle v. Torres, 756 F. Supp. 2d 983, 996 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (contrasting the authority 
delegated to the University of Chicago Police Department with the security guards in Wade v. Byles). 
58 Compare Johnson v. Univ. of San Diego, No. 10CV0504-LAB (NLS), 2011 WL 4345842, at *6 
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (student arrested by campus security officer, whom the court found was not a 
state actor), with Boyle, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 996 (student was arrested by campus police, whom the court 
found to be a state actor). 
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approaches. In many cases, campus police forces are closely intertwined 
with local law enforcement. For example, certain campus police forces 
derive their authority from agreements with local law enforcement, either 
because the state’s enabling statute is less explicit in its delegation of 
power, does not cover their school, or requires coordination with local law 
enforcement.59 Additionally, when campus police officers must go outside 
their statutory jurisdiction, they may require a certain amount of 
coordination with local law enforcement, another situation that could 
require the state involvement approach.60 Finally, states may confer 
authority on campus police forces by requiring them to fulfill state 
certification requirements.61 Therefore, even when campus police forces do 
not have statutory authority, pursue private ends, and are employed by a 
private university, they remain intertwined with the state. This grant of 
power to campus police forces thus raises the question: Given campus 
police forces’ ties to local law enforcement, are they private actors because 
of their employer, or are they state actors because of their certification? 
Most scholarship regarding private police forces has grouped campus 
police forces with other private entities that attempt to take over law 
enforcement functions, such as private residential and retail security.62 This 
Note, by contrast, examines the way courts have considered the explicit 
delegation of power to campus police from the state. When courts 
determine whether a private entity without this explicit delegation of power 
undertakes state action, the inquiry is based on the situation’s particular 
circumstances, even when the private entity is staffed by off-duty law 
enforcement.63 Moreover, these circumstances can include how the plaintiff 
 
59 For an example of a statute that requires mutual aid agreements with local law enforcement, see 
VA. CODE ANN. § 23-234 (2015). For an example of a university that entered into a memorandum of 
understanding with local law enforcement, see Johnson, 2011 WL 4345842, at *6. 
60 Private security may act under color of state law with sufficient coordination with local law 
enforcement. E.g., Smith v. Brookshire Bros., 519 F.2d 93, 94–95 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (finding 
that private security acted under color of state law when private security called local police, who 
arrested plaintiff using private security’s information and made no independent investigation). But see, 
e.g., Curtis v. Rosso & Mastracco, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 804, 808 (E.D. Va. 1976) (holding that police’s 
arrest of plaintiff at defendant’s request did not create state action). 
61 See, e.g., 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1020/1 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74G-8 (2015). 
62 See, e.g., Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 919 (2007); M. 
Rhead Enion, Note, Constitutional Limits on Private Policing and the State’s Allocation of Force, 
59 DUKE L.J. 519, 520 (2009). 
63 Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1975) (“It is the nature of the act performed, not 
the clothing of the actor or even the status of being on duty, or off duty, which determines whether the 
officer has acted under color of law.” (quoting Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933, 937 (E.D. Pa. 
1968)) (citing Robinson v. Davis, 447 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1971))); see also Huffman v. Cty. of Los 
Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that an off-duty police officer did not act under 
color of state law when he shot plaintiff because he was not in uniform and the gun used was 
defendant’s own, not the police department’s). But see Padover v. Gimbel Bros., 412 F. Supp. 920, 923 
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perceived the authority of the private entity.64 But campus police forces 
differ from other private police entities because of a unique characteristic: 
their explicit delegation of power from the state. Courts typically do not 
look to the entity’s empowering statute when determining whether an entity 
is a state actor. Even when a private entity’s use of power is authorized by 
statute, such as a state prison, courts typically apply a functionalist 
approach to determine action under color of state law.65 As a result, courts 
evaluate whether such entities engage in state action no differently than if 
there were no state statute. Furthermore, in Lebron v. National Railroad 
Passenger Corp.,66 the Court held that even though Amtrak was 
characterized as private in the statute granting Amtrak’s charter, this was 
not dispositive for determining whether the entity was a state actor.67 This 
case raises questions as to what the role of authority-granting statutes 
should be in determining whether any entity, including a campus police 
force, acts under color of state law. As described below, however, certain 
courts have been more formalist in considering state enabling statutes as 
part of their state action analysis, resulting in more disparate remedies. 
The three approaches to determine when private parties act under 
color of state law—the state involvement or encouragement, symbiotic 
relationship, and public function approaches—all require fact-specific 
inquiries into the public or private nature of the action itself. All of them 
also set high thresholds for private action to become state action. However, 
when a state explicitly delegates power to a private actor, as it often does in 
campus police enabling statutes, courts may turn their inquiry to how much 
power the statute explicitly delegates, affecting the public function test. 
Similarly, campus police forces that coordinate with local law enforcement 
have some state involvement in their activity that can be augmented by 
whether or not the state has “encouraged” the coordination by means of a 
statute. 
 
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (refusing to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim because employment as both a 
police officer and a store security guard could indicate state action). 
64 See Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 834–35 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that whether a strip 
search conducted by an off-duty police officer who was privately employed as a security guard 
constituted state action turned on whether the circumstances could lead plaintiff to believe that the strip 
search was being conducted as part of the officer’s official duties); Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 
152 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding state action when defendant “relied on his authority as a 
police officer to facilitate the assault” of the plaintiff, and plaintiff “felt she had to cooperate with his 
demands because he was a police officer”). 
65 See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55–56 (1988). 
66 513 U.S. 374 (1995). 
67 Id. at 392. 
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II. APPLYING § 1983 COLOR OF LAW ANALYSIS TO CAMPUS  
POLICE OFFICERS 
A. A Variety of State Enabling Statutes for Campus Police 
While states often grant campus police authority through enabling 
statutes, those statutes vary widely across states.68 These statutes granting 
authority to campus police usually include certain consistent elements, but 
these elements can differ in how statutes apply them, resulting in a 
patchwork of state enabling statutes granting campus police forces different 
levels of authority, oversight, and powers. State enabling statutes vary 
significantly in many ways: (1) oversight required for campus police 
forces, (2) training or certification requirements, (3) the geographical areas 
where campus police forces can operate, (4) coordination with local law 
enforcement, and (5) application to private universities as well as public 
universities. 
Oversight—One important way in which these statutes differ is the 
party to whom the campus police force is accountable: the university, with 
which the police force shares a name and from which it will often take 
direction; or the state, from which the campus police force derives its 
authority to make arrests and perform other typical police functions. In 
some cases, states maintain clear control over the appointment and 
licensing of campus police officers. For example, in Massachusetts, while 
officers of the university may request police officer appointments, it is the 
state that gives campus police officers their police powers.69 The state also 
retains the authority to set standards for campus police officers.70 
However, in many instances, the university maintains a clear authority 
role in a variety of ways. In Florida, for example, universities are required 
to write a policy manual establishing rules for “routine and emergency law 
enforcement situations.”71 Additionally, decisions about firearms are also 
often left up to universities or individual police forces.72 States that do 
allow firearms often require firearm-specific training or certification, much 
 
68 See Brown, supra note 2, at 1058–62, for an overview of the powers granted to campus police by 
Florida, Kansas, Indiana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. 
69 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22C, § 63 (2015). 
70 Id. 
71 FLA. STAT. § 1012.97(6) (2015). 
72 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74G-6(d) (2015) (allowing concealed firearms if authorized by 
individual campus police force); see also Brown, supra note 2, at 1064 (describing New Jersey law as 
allowing campus police officers to carry firearms when given authority from the university); Jeffrey S. 
Jacobson, Note, The Model Campus Police Jurisdiction Act: Toward Broader Jurisdiction for 
University Police, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 39, 71 (1995) (advocating that the decision whether 
campus police carry firearms be made by each university). 
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like local law enforcement.73 In North Carolina, the authority to enter into 
agreements with the relevant municipality to extend the campus police 
force’s jurisdiction beyond campus remains with the university.74 
Especially for urban universities, decisions expanding campus police 
jurisdiction can affect the timeliness of law enforcement action. Leaving 
such decisions to university discretion empowers them to influence law 
enforcement results. For example, an urban university could expand its 
jurisdiction into nearby neighborhoods in an attempt to push crime away 
from the university.75 Certain state enabling statutes give campus police the 
authority to enforce rules and regulations of the particular school, as well as 
the ordinary laws.76 As a result, students could assume that failure to 
comply with a campus police directive may result in arrest when the 
campus police officers are merely enforcing university regulations, not 
local laws. 
Training or Certification—Enabling statutes can also differ in the 
training or certification requirements the state imposes on campus police 
forces. Certain states, such as Illinois and North Carolina, require campus 
police officers to meet the same standards as some local law enforcement 
officers.77 Other states go even further and consider campus police officers 
to be part of the same law enforcement apparatus as municipal law 
enforcement officers.78 For example, Wyoming categorizes all law 
enforcement officers—such as sheriffs, municipal police officers, and 
campus police officers—uniformly as “peace officers,” with the same 
powers, including to arrest and issue citations.79 On the other hand, in 
Tennessee, while the state establishes minimum standards for campus 
police, individual schools can “establish additional qualifying factors, 
training standards, and policies” for campus police officers.80 Qualifications 
of campus police officers can therefore vary not only across states, but also 
among individual schools within the state itself. 
 
73 See, e.g., 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1020/1 (2015) (requiring firearms training). 
74 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74G-6(c). 
75 See, e.g., Jordan Larson, A Brief History of the UCPD, CHI. MAROON (May 25, 2012), 
http://chicagomaroon.com/2012/05/25/a-brief-history-of-the-ucpd/ [http://perma.cc/W62D-85JW] 
(describing a campus police’s jurisdiction expansion into surrounding neighborhoods). 
76 See, e.g., 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1020/1 (2015) (“The Board [of Trustees of a private 
college or university] shall assign duties, including the enforcement of college or university 
regulations . . . .”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 360.17(B)(3) (2015) (granting campus police the authority to 
enforce “[r]ules and regulations of the school”). 
77 See 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1020/1; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74G-8. 
78 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-101(a)(iv) (2014).  
79 Id. § 7-2-101 to -103. 
80 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-118(b) (2014). 
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Definition of Jurisdiction—Another area where state enabling statutes 
vary widely is the definition of the physical areas within which campus 
police can legally operate. Some states limit the powers of campus police 
strictly to areas near the school’s campus, though states define “campus” in 
a variety of ways.81 This can result in even more ambiguity for urban 
schools, where a narrow definition of campus in terms of property owned 
or operated by a school could result in a patchwork jurisdiction for campus 
police in the absence of a clearly defined, contiguous campus.82 Urban 
campuses may own the majority of buildings on a particular block, with 
private entities or individuals owning other buildings on the same block.83 
States sometimes resolve this issue by allowing police to pursue individuals 
beyond campus in specific law enforcement situations.84 Other states ignore 
the difficulties of precise definition and give campus police officers broad 
physical jurisdiction, granting powers to campus police forces in an entire 
jurisdiction where the university is located, such as the surrounding 
county85 or the entire state.86 Defining the jurisdiction of campus police 
forces is important because courts can throw out campus police arrests 
made outside the physical jurisdiction granted by the state’s enabling 
statute.87 Furthermore, certain states allow a person who is not a law 
enforcement officer to make an arrest if the person observes a crime being 
committed or has probable cause to believe that the arrestee is guilty of a 
crime, known as a citizen’s arrest.88 In such states, campus police officers 
who go outside their jurisdiction may attempt to make a citizen’s arrest if 
 
81 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-8-1 (2015) (defining “campus” for campus police jurisdiction as 
“grounds and buildings owned or occupied by a [public or private] college or university” as well as 
property within a certain radius of those buildings); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74G-6 (granting jurisdiction to 
campus police in “[r]eal property owned by or in the possession and control of the institution employing 
the officer” as well as the roads connecting such property). 
82 Hopkins & Neff, supra note 9, at 134 (noting the various ways that campus police jurisdictions 
are defined in state enabling statutes, and the difficulties that can arise in determining jurisdiction for 
urban campuses). 
83 See, e.g., George Washington Univ., George Washington University Campus, 
http://www.gwu.edu/sites/www.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Foggy%20Bottom%20Map%202014.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/W6C3-VW7M]; Georgetown Univ., Tour the Georgetown Campus, 
http://maps.georgetown.edu/ [http://perma.cc/GK4G-7GNR]; Univ. of Chi., University of Chicago 
Campus Map, https://maps.uchicago.edu/pdf/campus.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YF5-SV26]. 
84 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74G-6 (describing situations when campus police also have 
jurisdiction on any property while they are pursuing a person who committed an offense in the campus 
police force’s jurisdiction). 
85 See, e.g., 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1020/1 (2015). 
86 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-101 to -102 (2014). 
87 See Jacobson, supra note 72, at 44 (describing otherwise valid arrests that were thrown out “for 
lack of campus police jurisdiction”). 
88 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2403 (2014); see also Jacobson, supra note 72, at 69–70 
(describing universities’ justification of some arrests made by campus police as citizen’s arrests). 
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they are unable to use their statutorily granted power.89 In such cases, it is 
unclear if those campus police officers are still exercising the authority 
granted by the states through statute. 
Coordination with Local Law Enforcement—Some states do not grant 
authority to separate campus police forces directly by statute, but either 
substitute or supplement statutory grants of authority through mutual aid 
agreements with local law enforcement or by deputizing campus police 
forces directly into the local police force. Virginia, for example, gives 
broad police powers to campus police, but also requires the campus police 
force to be a party to a mutual aid agreement with local law enforcement.90 
Furthermore, campus police departments can supplement their jurisdiction 
by being deputized by local law enforcement, giving them police powers 
over a wider area.91 Additionally, such deputation can be used to evade 
statutory limits on campus policing. For example, Connecticut’s campus 
police statute covers only public universities,92 but private universities have 
historically circumvented this by deputizing their campus security 
departments directly into local law enforcement.93 Despite the statutory 
establishment of campus police only for public universities,94 Yale 
maintains a police department whose officers have “full powers of law 
enforcement and arrest.”95 Yale’s police officers “wear New Haven Police 
Department badges and are invested with their powers of arrest through the 
City of New Haven.”96 However, the Yale Police Department and New 
Haven Police Department are in fact two separate entities.97 Thus, private 
colleges in Connecticut that maintain their own police forces through local 
law enforcement may effectively operate outside the standards Connecticut 
established for public university police forces, and instead adopt the 
standards of the individual municipalities where the colleges are located. 
Furthermore, their endorsement by the state is somewhat unclear, which 
raises the question of how much power the state intended private university 
 
89 Jacobson, supra note 72, at 69–70 (describing a Kansas Supreme Court ruling that a municipal 
police officer could perform a citizen’s arrest if acting outside the scope of his or her police authority). 
90 VA. CODE ANN. § 23-234 (2015). 
91 Hopkins & Neff, supra note 9, at 129–30; see also Jacobson, supra note 72, at 65–67 (describing 
examples of deputation of campus police).  
92 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-156b (2014). 
93 Hopkins & Neff, supra note 9, at 130; see also Overview of the Yale Police Department, YALE 
UNIV., http://publicsafety.yale.edu/police [http://perma.cc/29Z3-7T8U]. 
94 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-156b. 
95 Overview of the Yale Police Department, supra note 93. 
96 Bharat Ayyar, City, Campus Jurisdictions Overlap for Police Depts., YALE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 
5, 2007), http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2007/11/05/city-campus-jurisdictions-overlap-for-police-depts/ 
[http://perma.cc/7MQQ-HXHW]. 
97 Id. 
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police forces to exercise, if any. This disparate treatment of public and 
private universities may stem from state legislatures’ desire to limit their 
involvement with private universities, but may also result from the state 
legislatures’ inattention to and failure to recognize the law enforcement 
character of private university police forces.98 
Public or Private—As indicated above, statutory grants of authority to 
campus police forces may be directed to private universities99 or only to 
public universities.100 Public campus police forces are arms of a state entity, 
and are therefore considered to be state actors regardless of whether the 
campus police force has separate statutory authority.101 Private university 
police forces, as private actors, face a more complex analysis.102 Some 
courts consider enabling statutes to be dispositive of state action.103 In such 
cases, whether states have explicitly delegated police authority to private 
colleges, or only to public colleges, can impact whether citizens in those 
states have a remedy. Alternatively, other courts only inquire into the 
public or private nature of the university when determining state action.104 
There, a state’s choice to delegate police powers to private colleges has no 
impact. Finally, including private colleges in enabling statutes can affect 
whether police forces at those schools have state oversight. 
These examples demonstrate the variation among state enabling 
statutes. However, state statutes cannot be categorized as more or less 
likely to permit a court to find state action. As the next Section 
demonstrates, a standardized statute framework alone will not ensure a 
consistent federal remedy for all citizens. Courts considering very similar 
statutes have reached different conclusions regarding whether campus 
 
98 In fact, Connecticut limits statutory establishment of special police forces to specific public 
universities. While this may be intentional, recent proposed legislation that would expand the statute to 
a community college, which is specifically pushing for expansion to include its campus but not other 
state community colleges, may indicate that the legislature selected the schools on a more ad hoc basis. 
See S.B. 1013, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015); Police at a Connecticut Community 
College Seek State Law for Guns, NEW HAVEN REG. (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.nhregister.com/
general-news/20150305/police-at-a-connecticut-community-college-seek-state-law-for-guns 
[http://perma.cc/J3MF-3CMM]. 
99 See, e.g., 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1020/1 (2015). 
100 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-156b (2014). 
101 See Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1118 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding that the fact a public 
university “derives its authority from the state . . . is itself persuasive of the presence of state action” of 
the university’s campus police force). 
102 See Lacey Perkins, Note, A Circumstantial Defense: Determining the Applicability of the Good 
Faith Defense for Campus Security in § 1983 Cases, 19 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 176, 190–91 
(2013–2014). 
103 See, e.g., Scott v. Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, No. 98 C 6614, 1999 WL 134059, at *3, *5–6 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 8, 1999). 
104 See Henderson, 631 F.2d at 1118. 
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police forces are state actors because courts have placed different weights 
on state enabling statutes in their color of law analysis. 
B. Applying the Color of Law Approaches to Campus Police 
Partially as a result of the variety among state enabling statutes, court 
rulings have differed significantly in determining whether campus police 
officers act under color of state law. The method for determining whether a 
private actor acts under color of state law is traditionally a fact-based 
inquiry.105 However, when courts consider the state’s method of granting 
authority, they can create different remedies in different states. This 
Section reviews the different ways courts treat methods of granting 
authority to campus police. Courts’ analyses of the state action question are 
affected by which method the states choose, which is often, but not always, 
an explicit enabling statute. First, some courts find explicit enabling 
statutes to be dispositive of state action. Second, courts may use explicit 
enabling statutes as one of many nondispositive factors in their analyses. 
Third, other courts must determine state action when states use 
nonstatutory methods of delegation, such as memoranda of understanding 
(MOU) with local law enforcement. Finally, certain courts must determine 
state action when states do not explicitly delegate power to campus police, 
but campus police forces effectively function as ordinary police forces. 
These differences impact whether citizens have § 1983 remedies and create 
inconsistent remedies across states. 
1. Explicit Enabling Statutes that Courts Consider Dispositive of 
State Action.—Explicit statutory delegation of authority has been 
found to help satisfy the public function approach, eliminating or reducing 
the need for a fact-specific inquiry.106 The Illinois enabling statute allows 
private universities to form police forces.107 Federal courts have viewed the 
Illinois statute as an explicit delegation of state authority to private 
universities that satisfies the public function approach.108 For example, in 
Scott v. Northwestern University School of Law, the court noted that the 
university police was no different from local law enforcement “because the 
 
105 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (describing “the necessarily fact-bound 
inquiry” of determining state action); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) 
(“Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in 
private conduct be attributed its true significance.”). 
106 See, e.g., Henderson, 631 F.2d at 1118; Boyle v. Torres, 756 F. Supp. 2d 983, 993–95 (N.D. Ill. 
2010); Scott, 1999 WL 134059, at *5 (“Because the police are vested with almost identical powers to 
those of county and municipal police, they exercise functions that are traditionally the exclusive 
prerogative of the state.”). 
107 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1020/1 (2015). 
108 See, e.g., Boyle, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 993–95; Scott, 1999 WL 134059, at *5. 
JAHNIG (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2015 10:50 AM 
110:249 (2015) Under School Colors 
267 
state has so authorized” the campus police.109 As a result, in states that do 
grant police power to both private and public campus police forces, courts 
will consider private campus police forces state actors, and citizens will 
have § 1983 remedies. 
2. Explicit Enabling Statutes that Courts Do Not Consider 
Dispositive of State Action.—However, other courts do not give 
such weight to methods of granting authority, even if the delegation of 
authority is explicitly through an enabling statute.110 For those courts, an 
enabling statute is not dispositive when determining state action. For 
example, the Pennsylvania enabling statute is similar to the Illinois statute 
in delegating powers to both public and private universities.111 However, 
the Third Circuit held police officers at the University of Pittsburgh to be 
state actors because the school was a public institution, noting the campus 
police enabling statute as a factor that merely “buttresse[d]” this 
conclusion.112 
Unlike in Illinois, lower federal courts in Pennsylvania have split 
regarding the weight to be placed on the fact that enabling statutes apply to 
both public and private police forces. On one hand, campus police officers 
at Franklin & Marshall College and the University of Pennsylvania did not 
act under color of law,113 even though campus police at these private 
universities also derive their authority from a state statute.114 On the other 
hand, a federal court also found that Bucknell University’s campus police 
could have acted under color of state law because of the delegation of 
police powers through statute.115 As a result, courts have provided different 
remedies when considering the same Pennsylvania statute. While enabling 
 
109 1999 WL 134059, at *3, *5–6; see also Boyle, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 993–95 (holding that 
university police officers acted under color of state law when arresting the plaintiff, and noting that, in 
addition to carrying guns, patrolling territory, wearing police uniforms, demanding citizens’ 
identification, and detaining citizens in handcuffs, the campus police force had a broad statutory grant 
of powers under Illinois law). 
110 See, e.g., Harper v. Franklin & Marshall Coll., No. 10-2647, 2011 WL 2746644, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 
July 14, 2011) (holding that, despite plaintiff’s detention by campus security officers, campus security 
did not act under color of state law even though they were appointed pursuant to state statute); Hargrove 
v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV. A. 93-5760, 1995 WL 584490, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 1995) (noting 
that allegations of action pursuant to statute did not make campus police officers’ behavior state action). 
111 See 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 646 (West 2015). 
112 Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1118 (3d Cir. 1980). 
113 Harper, 2011 WL 2746644, at *5; Hargrove, 1995 WL 584490, at *2. In both cases, the courts 
rejected arguments that the campus police officers acted under color of state law without specifically 
evaluating the factual circumstances. In Harper, the court failed to consider the public function of the 
campus security officers as separate from the private college itself. 2011 WL 2746644, at *5. 
114 See 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 646 (West 2015). 
115 Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., No. 4:11-CV-1679, 2012 WL 1569826, at *6 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 
2012). 
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statutes in Illinois and Pennsylvania delegate the same police powers to 
public and private universities, federal courts’ disparate treatment of these 
enabling statutes has given students at Illinois private universities a remedy 
under § 1983, but students at Pennsylvania private universities do not 
always have the same remedy. 
Courts in these cases look to other factors to determine whether 
campus police act under color of state law. In Hargrove v. City of 
Philadelphia, the court maintained the fact-specific inquiry typically found 
in state action analysis.116 In Henderson v. Fisher, the court looked to the 
public or private nature of the university itself.117 However, there are 
problems with both of these approaches. Enabling statutes explicitly 
granting police power to campus police are a useful proxy for 
comprehensive factual circumstances. A private police force that has been 
explicitly delegated power by statute is likely to exercise such power and 
comport itself in a way that an average person would perceive it no 
differently than ordinary police. An inquiry limited to the factual 
circumstances of each case may disregard the public perception of campus 
police forces as state actors. 
Inquiring into the public or private nature of the university itself can 
ignore the state’s policy choices delegating the exact same powers to public 
and private university police forces. Private universities themselves are 
rarely state actors, even when campus police are involved.118 Many courts 
have held that for a private university actor to act under color of state law, 
the state must be involved in the particular activity that violates 
constitutional rights.119 This standard places a high burden on the plaintiff. 
For example, when a student at a private university brought a claim arising 
from a local government internship, which she obtained through the school 
as part of a graduation requirement, the court declined to find sufficient 
state involvement.120 As a result, if public university campus police forces 
are considered state actors because of their integration with state 
universities, private university campus police forces will rarely be 
considered state actors if the same formalist test is applied. 
 
116 1995 WL 584490, at *2. 
117 631 F.2d at 1118. 
118 See, e.g., Klunder v. Brown Univ., 778 F.3d 24, 32–34 (1st Cir. 2015). 
119 See, e.g., Krohn v. Harvard Law Sch., 552 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1977); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 
73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. Isaacs v. Bd. of Trs. of Temple Univ. of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher 
Educ., 385 F. Supp. 473, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (“There are certain factual situations where a state’s 
involvement with a formally ‘private’ educational institution is so significant that any activity of that 
institution or its officers may fairly be characterized as ‘state action.’”). 
120 Rinsky v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., No. 10CV10779-NG, 2010 WL 5437289, at *1, *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 
27, 2010). 
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3. Nonstatutory Method of Granting Authority.—In some states, a 
campus police force may derive its power from a local law enforcement 
agency, but have no statutory recognition.121 When determining if a campus 
police force has acted under color of state law, a court that puts heavy 
emphasis on the enabling statute may reach a different conclusion than a 
court that instead prioritizes the relationship between the campus police 
force and local law enforcement. 
Where campus police officers perform the same police functions as 
local law enforcement, such as patrolling territory, asking for identification, 
and detaining individuals, without explicit statutory delegation of the 
authority to perform these functions, the same behavior might not be state 
action merely because of the method of delegation of power to the campus 
police force.122 For example, in Johnson v. University of San Diego, the city 
government had delegated authority over misdemeanor enforcement to the 
university police via an MOU.123 The court did not consider an MOU to be 
a sufficiently explicit delegation of police authority, and found there was 
no state action.124 Therefore, when courts consider statutory grants of 
authority to be dispositive, they may ignore other kinds of collaboration 
between campus police and the state. 
However, even if courts do not consider enabling statutes to be 
dispositive of state action, when states institute a patchwork of different 
levels of state involvement in campus police activity, it is difficult for 
courts to determine when the campus police activity crosses the line into 
state action. For example, Illinois requires campus police to meet the same 
law enforcement and firearms regulations as state law enforcement,125 while 
Tennessee allows schools to determine additional qualifications for their 
campus police officers.126 Even if campus police forces in these two states 
must ultimately meet the same qualifications, and both derive their power 
from state statutes, courts that place different weight on the elements of 
those statutes may reach different conclusions regarding the state’s 
involvement. State statutes providing certification requirements for campus 
police officers raise the question of whether such certification requirements 
 
121 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-156b (2014); Overview of the Yale Police Department, supra 
note 93. 
122 See Johnson v. Univ. of San Diego, No. 10CV0504-LAB (NLS), 2011 WL 4345842, at *6–7 
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (finding that an MOU between local law enforcement and campus police was 
not a sufficient delegation of police power to satisfy the public function approach). The University of 
San Diego is a private university. Id. at *6. 
123 Id. at *6. 
124 Id. 
125 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1020/1 (2015). 
126 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-118(b) (2014). 
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are a sufficient “coercive power” or “encouragement” of the campus police 
force’s action to convert it into action under color of state law. 
4. No Explicit Delegation of Authority to Campus Police.—Finally, 
certain states do not delegate any police powers to private universities;127 
instead, private universities form their own police forces outside of 
statutory or other state authority. For example, Connecticut grants police 
authority via statute to public universities, while the statute is silent about 
campus police forces at private universities.128 However, some private 
universities within the state have their own sworn police officers and police 
forces.129 If federal courts in Connecticut considered enabling statutes to be 
dispositive of state action, private university campus police would not be 
state actors because their power would not be explicitly delegated through 
statute. Students at those schools would not have § 1983 remedies, 
although the private campus police act in accordance with an agreement 
with local law enforcement and perform essentially the same functions as 
the public university’s police. 
Even if courts took none of these approaches and relied on a strictly 
fact-specific inquiry, the inquiry can ignore critical aspects of students’ 
perceptions and interactions with campus police. In Robinson v. Davis, 
local police officers that were employed part-time for the university 
summoned a group of students for questioning at the request of the state 
law enforcement.130 The Fourth Circuit did not consider the campus police 
officers to be state actors because the students were “cognizant” that the 
police officers were acting as employees of the university when 
summoning the students.131 However, the court did not consider the impact 
of this cognizance: If the students had not obeyed the security officers, 
would they have been expelled or arrested? 
These unresolved questions highlight the uncertainty plaguing 
students and residents in the communities surrounding universities 
regarding their relationship to the campus police force protecting them. The 
ways states delegate authority to campus police, and the ways courts treat 
these delegations of authority, impact whether citizens have § 1983 
remedies. Taking the approach of federal courts in Illinois, and considering 
enabling statutes to be dispositive of state action, will not necessarily result 
 
127 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-156b (2014) (granting police authority only to public 
universities); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-118 (2014) (granting police authority only to private universities 
of a certain size). 
128 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-156b; see also supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text. 
129 Hopkins & Neff, supra note 9, at 130; Overview of the Yale Police Department, supra note 93. 
130 447 F.2d 753, 754–55 (4th Cir. 1971). 
131 Id. at 758. 
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in consistent remedies across states for a federal law. In states such as 
Illinois, private campus police are considered state actors, but in other 
states, other private university police forces may not be state actors, even if 
they act in exactly the same way. But states’ choices of how to delegate 
authority to campus police can affect whether citizens have a § 1983 
remedy as well. Given the variety of methods of delegating power to 
campus police forces in general, and the variances among enabling statutes 
in particular, an individual’s ability to seek a § 1983 remedy may depend 
on what state he or she is in. 
III. A PROPOSED UNIFORM CAMPUS POLICE ENABLING  
STATUTE FRAMEWORK 
Courts’ consistent treatment of state methods of delegating authority 
to campus police would be a start toward ensuring that all citizens have 
remedies for what is effectively police action. However, such consistent 
treatment will not result in uniform remedies for citizens if states continue 
to rely on a patchwork grant of authority to campus police, who can 
exercise that authority regardless of how it is delegated. A move toward 
uniformity could be accomplished through a model statute that states would 
be strongly encouraged to adopt,132 especially because many states may not 
be aware of the implications of their legislative choices. The benefits of a 
model statute are not limited to ensuring that citizens have a § 1983 
remedy. Such a model statute would also clarify the role of campus police, 
and give campus police forces themselves a clearer jurisdictional mandate 
than they currently have in many states. States would also benefit from a 
model statute that clearly delineates campus police certification 
requirements and oversight provisions. 
A. Terms of the Proposed Model Statute Framework 
This model statute framework133 should have several key elements: (1) 
broad delegation of police power; (2) no distinction between public and 
private schools; (3) administrative, but not law enforcement, oversight by 
the university; (4) separating enforcement of laws and campus regulations; 
(5) flexible physical jurisdiction; (6) a codified relationship to law 
enforcement; and (7) optionality. 
 
132 Model statutes and uniform state laws provide many benefits to states. About the ULC, 
UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlawcommission.com/Narrative.aspx?title=
About%20the%20ULC [http://perma.cc/E27U-PSZR]. While this Note does not propose a specific 
statute, the following Section lays out general terms and their rationales. 
133 As noted throughout this Section, this framework draws on elements of several current campus 
police enabling statutes. 
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Broad Delegation of Police Power—First, the model statute should 
represent a broad delegation of police power. While some, especially 
students, might balk at the prospect of explicitly handing police power over 
to universities, it is clear that many university police forces already 
exercise this broad police power, even without statutory authorization.134 
The model police statute would benefit students and citizens by 
accompanying the delegation of police power with a strong training and 
certification requirement. Campus police officers should meet the same 
standards as local law enforcement, especially for firearm certification. 
No Public–Private Distinction—Second, the model statute should 
make no distinction between public and private schools. Given that private 
schools effectively maintain their own campus police forces even in states 
that only explicitly grant police powers to public universities,135 expanding 
the delegation of police power to all schools would codify existing 
practices. It would also bring state oversight to campus police forces in 
private schools, rather than relying on local law enforcement to provide 
such oversight. As a result, oversight of campus police forces will be more 
consistent, as opposed to disparate policies devised by municipalities. 
States that currently limit their campus police enabling statutes may do so 
because public colleges are more heavily regulated than private colleges. 
Alternatively, states may wish to provide more oversight to public 
university campus police forces.136 However, such intentions have caused a 
two-tiered system where private universities in such states still operate 
campus police forces, but with less oversight than public universities. A 
model statute that covers both public and private schools will ensure that 
state legislatures do not allow private universities to slip through the 
cracks. 
Oversight by the University—Third, the model statute should continue 
to allow for a base level of university oversight. For example, a university 
should be able to choose whom to hire for its campus police force. 
However, to the extent university administrators are involved in making 
law enforcement decisions,137 they ought to be recognized as state actors 
 
134 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-156b (2014); Stephanie Addenbrooke & Joey Ye, After 
Thwarted Theft Attempt in Trumbull, YPD Arrests Intruder, YALE DAILY NEWS (Jan. 25, 2015), 
http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2015/01/25/after-thwarted-theft-attempt-in-trumbull-ypd-arrests-
intruder/ [http://perma.cc/2NT7-8T8D]. 
135 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-156b; Overview of the Yale Police Department, supra 
note 93. 
136 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-156a (requiring biannual review of public college campus police 
security plans). 
137 See, e.g., 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1020/1 (2015) (“The Board [of Trustees of a private college or 
university] shall assign duties . . . .”). 
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when those decisions cause constitutional rights violations. Private 
university administrators should not be able to avoid liability when they 
direct law enforcement activity. 
As noted above, it is rare for private universities themselves to act 
under color of state law.138 However, some courts have recognized that 
when universities—especially private universities—employ campus police 
forces, university administrators may become involved in directing law 
enforcement activities. This direction could potentially result in university 
administrators, if not the universities, being state actors. In Klunder v. 
Brown University, the district court did not grant summary judgment 
against a private university and its president in the face of potential § 1983 
violations by its campus police officer, indicating more facts were required 
to determine if the administrators were state actors.139 On appeal, the First 
Circuit ruled the private university itself was not a state actor, but did not 
resolve on the merits whether the university president was a state actor.140 
Thus, it is unclear whether university supervisors can be held accountable 
when the universities themselves are not state actors. However, under the 
proposed model statute, authority for law enforcement activities would 
come from the state, not the university, limiting the university’s role to 
enforcing school regulations. This would ensure that private campus police 
forces have strong state oversight. 
Laws and School Regulations—Fourth, campus police forces must be 
allowed to enforce the rules and regulations of the college or university, 
because they will still be university employees and bound by those 
regulations, as are other members of the faculty and staff. However, the 
model statute must be clear that campus police cannot use their state-
delegated police powers to enforce such university regulations. Instead, 
they must go through the proper channels of university rule enforcement. 
For example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that the 
campus police force of a religious college has the statutory law 
enforcement authority to “enforce only the law, not campus policies or 
religious rules.”141 Campus policies and rules are instead enforced through 
the college’s disciplinary proceedings, which are intentionally separated 
from legal proceedings and controlled by the college’s administration.142 
 
138 See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text. 
139 778 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2015).  
140 Id. at 31–32. 
141 State v. Yencer, 718 S.E.2d 615, 620 (N.C. 2011). 
142 See, e.g., DAVIDSON COLL., THE RED BOOK: STUDENT HANDBOOK 12–14 (2015), 
http://www.davidson.edu/Documents/Administrative%20Department/Dean%20of%20Students/Student
-Handbook-Rev.081115.pdf [http://perma.cc/FP6U-T5Q2]. 
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There are three justifications for separating law and regulation 
enforcement in the statutory police duties. First, members of the 
surrounding community should not be subject to arrest for violations of 
rules of a university that they are not a part of. Separating these duties 
lessens the risk that nonuniversity members are subjected to unnecessary, 
and potentially unconstitutional, police interactions. Second, private 
universities may have rules and regulations that would be unconstitutional 
if enforced by the state. For example, a private religious college can 
endorse the tenets of a specific religion, but the state cannot. The Supreme 
Court of North Carolina reinforced this rule when holding that North 
Carolina’s campus police enabling statute was permissible because it did 
not allow religious colleges to enforce religious rules, but only state laws.143 
University police enforcing such regulations using their police power is 
both a clear constitutional rights violation and, under the model statute, 
would be action under color of state law. The model statute would make 
these two roles clearly distinct. 
Third, students generally feel beholden to the university they attend, 
and are aware that failure to comply with university regulations can result 
in the school taking disciplinary action. However, the same students will 
probably be even more inclined to comply with the laws and directives of 
law enforcement agents. When campus police officers have the authority to 
enforce both local statutes and university regulations, the line between the 
two can be blurred.144 Because campus police are representatives of their 
university, students may feel compelled to obey police directives, even if 
the directives violated students’ rights. Because citizens’ perception of 
private actors can affect whether they act under color of state law,145 this 
additional layer of power can potentially alter the state action analysis. 
Flexible Physical Jurisdiction—Fifth, the model statute should require 
universities that establish police forces to define “campus” in coordination 
with local law enforcement. Rather than promulgating a bright line for 
 
143 Yencer, 718 S.E.2d at 620. To allow campus police forces to enforce university regulations in 
addition to laws could lead to arrests for failure to comply with religious colleges’ codes of conduct, 
which would effectively render such campus police enabling statutes unconstitutional for violations of 
the Establishment Clause. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215–17 (1963) 
(explaining that the Establishment Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
144 See, e.g., NW. UNIV., NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY STUDENT HANDBOOK 2013–14, at 8–9 
(2013), http://www.publichealth.northwestern.edu/docs/TGS_Student_Handbook_2013-14_.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/FB9S-5GWR]; see also Asher Klein, Student Arrested in Reg, CHI. MAROON (Feb. 26, 2010), 
http://chicagomaroon.com/2010/02/26/student-arrested-in-reg/ [http://perma.cc/XJ8T-FMX5] 
(describing a college student being arrested for trespass and resisting arrest after police originally were 
called because the student was making noise in the library). 
145 See Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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what buildings or sidewalks constitute a campus,146 such decisions ought to 
be made on a case-by-case basis, reflecting individual schools’ 
geographical character. Significant confusion can arise when jurisdictions 
change from block to block. While local law enforcement agencies are still 
state actors even if they abuse their power,147 this conclusion has not been 
tested for campus police forces that operate outside their jurisdiction; if 
invalid arrests are thrown out, will those arrested still have a § 1983 
remedy? Similarly, campus police forces may attempt to use the power of 
citizens’ arrests when outside their statutory jurisdiction.148 Citizens’ arrests 
have generally been considered a power not exclusive to the state.149 As 
when campus police forces enforce university regulations, most students 
would likely not think that campus police forces are using a citizen’s arrest 
when outside their jurisdiction; they would probably assume the individual 
who looks like a police officer and acts like a police officer, is in fact a 
police officer. Although there will still be jurisdictional boundaries, outside 
which campus police forces must yield to local law enforcement, the 
explicit police status of campus police that the model statute creates will 
make these transitions seamless because both territories are patrolled by 
statutorily recognized law enforcement. 
Relationship to Law Enforcement—Sixth, schools should not be able 
to circumvent the statute’s grant of authority by instead being deputized 
through local law enforcement. Schools accepting the police powers 
delegated should automatically receive the accompanying privileges and 
responsibilities. This would not prevent campus police forces from 
coordinating logistically with local law enforcement, especially where 
jurisdictions overlap or are adjacent. The statute should therefore allow 
such coordination in the same manner that two ordinary law enforcement 
agencies with adjacent jurisdictions would cooperate. In fact, confusion 
regarding physical jurisdiction of campus police could be lessened if 
campus police are explicitly recognized as state law enforcement agencies 
with police power. The proposed model statute would thus promote 
uniformity among states, and also resolve the areas of uncertainty in many 
of the current state enabling statutes. 
 
146 Currently, some states have implemented such bright-line rules. See Jacobson, supra note 72, at 
43 (describing the various ways that states define the physical jurisdiction of campus police forces).  
147 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 
172, 184, 187 (1961).  
148 See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of San Diego, No. 10CV0504-LAB (NLS), 2011 WL 4345842, at *6 
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011); see also Jacobson, supra note 72, at 69–70 (exploring the possibility of 
campus police officers justifying off-campus arrests as citizen’s arrests). 
149 E.g., Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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Optionality—Finally, the formation of campus police forces should be 
optional. Many colleges may lack the size, resources, or inclination to 
support a police force, while others may simply choose to rely on local law 
enforcement to enforce the law.150 However, the provision in the statute 
describing the option to create such a force should also clarify that schools 
which do “opt out” would not be able to circumvent the rules by creating a 
private, armed security force with the power to arrest. The privileges that 
come with law enforcement, such as the power to arrest or carry firearms, 
must be accompanied by adherence to the statute. 
B. Judicial Treatment of Campus Police Officers Under the Proposed 
Model Statute Framework 
While some scholars have urged the abandonment of the state action 
doctrine altogether,151 and others have advocated for a recalibration of this 
doctrine specifically for private policing,152 this Note provides a solution 
that retains existing jurisprudence while also protecting individual liberties 
by ensuring a uniform § 1983 remedy. In fact, the proposed model statute 
framework would bring color of law analysis for campus police forces 
closer to the fact-specific analysis used for other private actors. 
A model statute framework adopted by many states would assist the 
courts in standardizing their approach toward campus police forces and 
state action and conserving federal § 1983 remedies. Courts should 
accompany a consistent state statute framework with affirmation of the 
fact-specific inquiry typical of § 1983 cases;153 even explicit statutory 
delegation of broad police powers should not be dispositive of state action. 
However, such a broad, explicit statutory delegation of police power would 
be one of the factors, and courts should adopt the approach of federal 
courts in Illinois, effectively treating campus police officers who receive 
their broad power through statute the same as ordinary law enforcement 
officers: 
 
150 Many small rural colleges have private security officers but not full-fledged police departments 
with the power to make arrests. See, e.g., The Department of Public Safety, MIDDLEBURY COLL., http:// 
www.middlebury.edu/offices/health/publicsafety/about [http://perma.cc/CM2F-Z3KH]. Alternatively, 
urban schools with a strong local police force may simply rely on local law enforcement to carry out 
arrests. See, e.g., COLUMBIA UNIV. PUB. SAFETY, 2014 ANNUAL SECURITY AND FIRE SAFETY REPORT 4 
(2014), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/publicsafety/SecurityReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/8LWW-S54K]. 
Columbia University’s relationship with the NYPD may also be a product of New York’s campus 
police enabling statute, which is limited to public universities. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 355 (Consol. 
2014). 
151 E.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 36, at 550–56. 
152 E.g., Enion, supra note 62, at 545. 
153 For a discussion of the fact-specific inquiry that is typical of § 1983 actions, see supra notes 52–
53 and accompanying text. 
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By accepting this authorization, [a university] and its police must also accept 
the grave responsibility to protect an individual’s constitutional rights, the 
same responsibility that § 1983 enforces against municipal and other police 
forces. To permit the state to delegate its police powers to [a university] and 
then shield the [university] police force from liability when, in exercising 
these powers, it violates the rights of ‘students, employees, [and] visitors’ 
would pervert the language and intent of § 1983.154 
Therefore, campus police forces would act under color of state law 
whenever ordinary police forces would. This model statute framework 
would formalize the effective relationship students and citizens have with 
campus police forces as extensions of law enforcement. 
1. Public Function Approach.—One key result of a model campus 
police enabling statute and consistent judicial treatment of that statute is a 
finding of state action when campus police act in their official capacity. In 
particular, campus police action would satisfy the public function approach 
and would be under color of state law. The analysis of Scott155 and Boyle,156 
two federal cases in Illinois, best exemplified this outcome using the public 
function approach. The Illinois enabling statute shares many features with 
the proposed model statute framework, including explicit delegation of 
broad police power, such as the ability to arrest and carry firearms; 
application to private universities; and training and certification 
requirements.157 The court in Scott noted the statute’s broad delegation of 
police power was effectively the delegation of the state’s entire police 
power to private university police forces: “Because the police are vested 
with almost identical powers to those of county and municipal police, they 
exercise functions that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the 
state.”158 Similarly, the court in Boyle emphasized the broad powers 
delegated to the private university police force: 
[The university police officers] carry guns, they wear police uniforms, and 
they patrol their territory in squad cars; they have the ongoing authority to 
detain citizens and place them in handcuffs; they have the authority to demand 
that individuals furnish them with ID. When the ensemble of the officers’ 
 
154 Scott v. Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, No. 98 C 6614, 1999 WL 134059, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 
1999) (fourth alteration in original). 
155 Id. 
156 756 F. Supp. 2d 983 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
157 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1020/1 (2015). Note that while many of these elements are featured in 
multiple enabling statutes, Illinois is used as an example because of the way federal courts have 
considered the statute in the their public function analysis. 
158 Scott, 1999 WL 134059, at *5. 
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powers and functions is kept in view, there can be no doubt that they are state 
actors.159 
Thus, when statutes explicitly delegate broad police power, courts can 
clearly identify exclusive government functions performed by private 
campus police forces. Even if any one of these functions alone is not 
necessarily exclusive to the state,160 their combination in campus police 
forces shows a private entity that acts in a manner shared only by state 
actors. Additionally, while delegating broad police powers to campus 
police may effectively only codify the status quo, making the delegation 
explicit by statute illustrates that the delegated powers are exclusive to the 
state. After all, states would not need statutes to allow campus police forces 
to exercise such broad power if that power could be exercised by an entity 
other than the state. 
An explicit enabling statute which describes the police powers 
delegated would further help courts determine specifically which police 
powers have been delegated, a task made more difficult when campus 
police forces rely on other means of gaining authority.161 Explicit granting 
of broad police power would also accurately reflect citizens’ perception 
of—and relationship to—campus police. Therefore, in addition to 
providing uniformity, oversight, and clarity, this model framework would 
more accurately reflect campus police forces’ exercise of traditionally 
exclusive government functions. 
2. State Coercion and Symbiotic Relationship Approaches.—While 
the proposed model statute framework would indicate action under color of 
law through the public function approach, it is also likely to satisfy the 
other two approaches: the state encouragement approach and the symbiotic 
relationship approach. First, a statute delegating these functions would 
indicate state encouragement of the campus police forces. While some 
might argue that a model statute would represent mere regulation of, or 
acquiescence to, campus police activity, which do not indicate state 
action,162 explicitly delegating police powers to colleges or universities 
would be “significant” assistance to the university’s mission of enforcing 
laws on its campus and ensuring the safety of members of its community.163 
 
159 756 F. Supp. 2d at 995. 
160 See Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir. 1996). 
161 See Johnson v. Univ. of San Diego, No. 10CV0504-LAB (NLS), 2011 WL 4345842, at *6 (S.D. 
Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (finding that an MOU between local police and campus security “is not a total 
delegation of police powers”). 
162 See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (acquiescence); Jackson v. Metro. Edison 
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (regulation). 
163 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991). 
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By enforcing the state’s law on the state’s behalf, the campus police force 
would effectively be an agent of the state. In addition, the fact that the 
campus police could only use the delegated power to enforce state laws, not 
university regulations, strengthens the campus police forces’ position as an 
arm of the state. Acting as an agent of the state would be a sufficiently 
close “nexus” between campus police and the state because the campus 
police may be “fairly treated as that of the [s]tate itself.”164 As a result, the 
statute would satisfy the state encouragement test. 
Second, the proposed statute framework would create a symbiotic 
relationship between the state and the universities. Universities would 
obtain the benefits of clear delegated statutory authority to maintain a 
police force and protect its students, faculty, staff, and visitors, while the 
state would no longer have to spend money, time or manpower on territory 
now patrolled by campus police. These mutual benefits between the state 
and the campus police force would satisfy the symbiotic relationship test 
because each would derive a benefit from the other’s action.165 
C. Additional Benefits to the Proposed Model Statute Framework 
The proposed framework would result in a number of benefits for 
universities, states, and members of university communities. First, 
individuals whose constitutional rights were violated by campus police will 
uniformly be ensured a remedy, regardless of what school the campus 
police represent. Consistency and uniformity in this remedy will align with 
the intent of § 1983 to provide a remedy to all citizens, especially in light 
of the original purpose of § 1983 to promote uniform enforcement of civil 
rights across states.166 Second, the explicit nature of the statute will make 
powers of campus police officers clear to all parties. Students and citizens 
will clearly benefit from understanding their relationship to campus police 
as one of citizens to law enforcement. Clear statutory guidelines will also 
help campus police departments understand their own role. In states where 
campus police do not currently have clear statutory authority, or an unclear 
degree of statutory authority, clearer guidelines will ensure that campus 
police forces know they have state authority when they purport to exercise 
it. 
Third, students, citizens, universities, and campus police officers will 
be able to more clearly separate law enforcement activities from the 
university’s educational mission. Currently, because of a university’s 
 
164 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351; see also supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text. 
165 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961). 
166 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172–73 (1961).  
JAHNIG (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2015 10:50 AM 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
280 
unique authority relationship to students, students may view campus police 
exclusively as university agents and not consider them state actors. If 
campus police take different approaches to enforcing laws and university 
regulations, students and citizens will be able to better grasp their own 
constitutional rights and understand the authority role of both the university 
and the campus police. Finally, the proposed framework would not require 
a drastic shift in the way current campus police forces operate. Many 
university police forces that do not have the broad statutory delegation of 
authority already operate the way the proposed model statute envisions.167 
The statute would thus provide a number of benefits while minimally 
intruding on the states’ discretion and requiring minimal change in campus 
police behavior. 
D. Limitations of the Proposed Model Statute Framework 
The proposed model statute framework does create federalism 
concerns, especially if states only want to grant limited police power to 
university police departments. Allowing states to experiment with state-
specific solutions to different problems, as opposed to rigid national 
uniformity, has often been invoked as a benefit of federalism.168 For 
example, perhaps states intend to provide more state oversight of public-
university campus police forces than private-university campus police 
forces. Some scholars have also argued standardization is sometimes best 
achieved through using the states as outlets for experimentation, through 
which the best policies can become clear.169 Even if this model statute were 
not forced on states, it would not achieve its uniformity benefits without 
widespread adoption, which would likely require strong encouragement. 
On the practical side, states may also be resistant to change their varied 
methods of enabling campus police forces to a standardized regime, as has 
been the case with even now-popular model statutes, such as the Uniform 
Commercial Code.170 
However, this resistance can be overcome because the need to impose 
national uniformity can outweigh the value of experimentation.171 In this 
case, these concerns are outweighed by the fact that § 1983 gives citizens a 
 
167 See, e.g., Overview of the Yale Police Department, supra note 93. 
168 E.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
169 E.g., Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional Rights, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2004) (“There are times for the national government to stand back and 
let policies emerge at a lower level of decision making . . . .”). 
170 Sean Michael Hannaway, Note, The Jurisprudence and Judicial Treatment of the Comments to 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 962, 968 (1990). 
171 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1789 (2006). 
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uniform remedy, regardless of what state they live or attend college in. 
Moreover, current campus police enabling methods present a particular 
problem because of the wide variety of solutions adopted by states creating 
disparity in federal remedies. There is so little uniformity among states’ 
solutions that an effective solution is found by taking the best elements 
from existing state statutes, as opposed to choosing one particular option of 
existing state enabling regimes. This uniformity is needed to protect the 
remedies secured by § 1983; the purpose of § 1983 has always been to 
ensure that federal rights are guaranteed for all, even if the states 
themselves infringe upon them.172 When these federal rights become less 
uniform because of the patchwork analysis of campus police, states can 
usurp these uniform federal rights. 
Furthermore, in many cases the proposed model statute would merely 
be a codification of the status quo. Even in states where there is no enabling 
statute for private campus police, private universities maintain police forces 
anyway.173 The statute’s primary result would be guaranteeing remedies for 
rights violations, rather than altering campus police behavior. States will 
still maintain discretion in how they certify and train local law 
enforcement. Furthermore, federalism implies that different states take 
different approaches to a particular issue, in this case, campus police 
authority. However, there already is a level of uniformity in campus police 
behavior, regardless of the method of granting authority. Campus police 
forces exist at schools that are not covered by existing enabling statutes and 
behave like ordinary police forces, very similar to schools that are covered 
by such statutes.174 
Additional limitations may result from university hesitation to get too 
entangled with the state. However, accepting broad power gives the 
university a level of accountability for its police force, which it must have 
if it undertakes to provide law enforcement on its own campus. Finally, 
small or rural schools that have a minimal local law enforcement presence 
may want to increase security around their campuses, but may not have the 
infrastructure to provide the supervision or support for a police force 
envisioned by the model statute. However, such schools will likely require 
a smaller campus police presence than large urban universities. 
Furthermore, because the creation of a campus police force is optional, 
schools will always be able to rely on local law enforcement if they are not 
willing to bear the costs of a regulated campus police force. To have such a 
 
172 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961). 
173 See, e.g., Overview of the Yale Police Department, supra note 93. 
174 See, e.g., Addenbrooke & Ye, supra note 134; Overview of the Yale Police Department, supra 
note 93. 
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police force, universities should bear that cost because the alternative 
would have individuals bearing the cost of a rights violation without a 
§ 1983 remedy. 
CONCLUSION 
The lack of uniformity and consistency among state enabling statutes 
for campus police can lead to different results when courts determine 
whether those campus police forces act under color of state law under 
§ 1983. Courts may consider campus police forces to be state actors in 
certain states, but not others, even for very similar behaviors. Different 
results in tests for state action can effectively prevent some students and 
citizens from seeking a remedy when campus police violate their 
constitutional rights. This Note has considered the various inconsistencies 
among state statutes and the results courts have reached as a result of those 
inconsistencies. This Note then proposed a model uniform statute 
framework for states to grant broad police power to campus police, which 
would codify the existing behaviors of many campus police forces. Such a 
statute would provide additional clarity to courts, states, and universities 
themselves, while also ensuring that no student or citizen is deprived of a 
remedy under § 1983. 
 
